Symmetrical Information Disclosure for Investors’ Investment Decisions
About this article
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.14419/ijet.v7i3.30.18341Keywords:
Information Disclosure, Agency Theory, Investment Decisions.Abstract
Information disclosure is crucial in the financial market that allow investors to understand the current and future performance of companies and help them in their investment decisions. This paper aim to examine the importance of information disclosure to safeguard the investor investment. This paper will refine the theoretical background of agency theory associated with the information disclosure. The findings of this paper provide a new dimension of symmetrical information disclosure with the aim to sustain a firm in the financial market and enhance investors’ confidence.
References
Raithatha M, Bapat V. Impact of corporate governance on financial disclosures: Evidence from India. Corp Ownersh Control. 2014;12(1CONT9).
Ali R, Liu Y, Niazi GR. Corporate governance and performance of peer firms: A cross-lagged analysis of an emerging economy. J Appl Bus Res. 2017;33(3):547-564. doi:10.19030/jabr.v33i3.9946
Healy PM, Palepu KG. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. J Account Econ. 2001;31(1-3):405-440. doi:10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00018-0
Verrecchia RE. Essays on disclosure. J Account Econ. 2001;32(1-3):97-180. doi:10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00025-8
Watson A, Shrives P, Marston C. Voluntary Disclosure of Accounting Ratios in the UK. Br Account Rev. 2002;34(4):289-313. doi:10.1006/S0890-8389(02)00077-X
View more references (13)
Laskin A V. Nonfinancial Information in Investor Communications. Int J Bus Commun. 2016;53(4):375-397. doi:10.1177/2329488414525458
Graham JR, Harvey CR, Rajgopal S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting. J Account Econ. 2005;40(1-3):3-73. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002
Gibbins M, Richardson A, Waterhouse J. The Management of Corporate Financial Disclosure: Opportunism, Ritualism, Policies, and Processes. J Account Res. 1990;28(1):121-143. doi:10.2307/2491219
Cooke TE. Voluntary Corporate Disclosure by Swedish Companies. J Int Financ Manag Account. 1989;1(2):171-195. doi:10.1111/j.1467-646X.1989.tb00009.x
Holland JB. Private disclosure and financial reporting. Account Bus Res. 1998;28(4):255-269. doi:10.1080/00014788.1998.9728914
Barker RG. The market for information—evidence from finance directors, analysts and fund managers. Account Bus Res. 1998;29(1):3-20. doi:10.1080/00014788.1998.9729563
Chang M, D’Anna G, Watson I, Wee M. Does Disclosure Quality via Investor Relations Affect Information Asymmetry? Aust J Manag. 2008;33(2):375-390. doi:10.1177/031289620803300208
Jensen C, Meckling H. THEORY OF THE FIRM : MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR , AGENCY COSTS AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE I . Introduction and summary In this paper WC draw on recent progress in the theory of ( 1 ) property rights , firm . In addition to tying together elements of the theory of e. J financ econ. 1976;3:305-360.
Preston BLEEE. Corporation and Society : The Search for a Paradigm. 1975;13(2):434-453.
Jankensgard H. The Relationship between Voluntary Disclosure, External Financing and Financial Status. J Bus Financ Account. 2015;42(7-8):860-884. doi:10.1111/jbfa.12120
Botosan CA. Disclosure of Level and the Cost Equity Capital. 2013;72(3):323-349.
Allegrini M, Greco G. Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies. J Manag Gov. 2013;17(1):187-216. doi:10.1007/s10997-011-9168-3
Norman, Mohd Saleh; Mohamat Sabri H. Intellectual capital indicators influencing investment decision Norman Mohd Saleh * and Mohamat Sabri Hassan. 2013;10(2).