What characteristics of board of directors affect Indonesian bank performance?

  • Authors

    • Stevanus Pangestu Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia
    • Christiana Fara Dharmastuti Atma Jaya Catholic University of Indonesia
  • Corporate Governance, Bank Performance, Board Characteristic, Agency Problem, Upper Echelon.
  • The sustainability of a firm is determined by the effectiveness of its board of directors. Hambrick and Mason’s Upper Echelon theory states that management characteristics could predict organizational outcomes. This study examines the effects of the characteristics of board of directors on the performance of publicly-traded banks in Indonesia. The measures of board characteristics are educational attainment, presence of independent directors, employment of foreign directors, compensation of directors, and age of directors. Our 58 firm-year observations from 2014-2015 were analyzed using fixed effects model. We find evidence that bank profitability is (i) positively affected by doctorate education of board members and (ii) negatively affected by remuneration of top executives. Based on our findings, we would suggest corporations to: comply with governmental regulations regarding the employment of independent directors, align the interest between principals and agents to eliminate agency problem, and accommodate board members with scholarships designated for academic development.

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    Pangestu, S., & Dharmastuti, C. F. (2018). What characteristics of board of directors affect Indonesian bank performance?. International Journal of Accounting and Economics Studies, 6(1), 48-52. https://doi.org/10.14419/ijaes.v6i1.9278