The cognitive contribution within the Tunisian venture capital funded firms
Abstract
The present research work’s major objective lies in investigating the scope of the venture capitalist’ cognitive contribution following their financial participation in the company's capital. Conducted on a sample of 70 Tunisian venture capital funded firms, operating up the year 2015, the survey reached findings have proved to reveal well the significant impact this financial intermediation mode appears to have on kindling cognitive resources, in its association with the contractor. Noteworthy, however, is that the cognitive contribution has been discovered to be constrained, in turn, by the venture capital organization’s proper ownership structure.
About this article
Keywords
- Cognitive Resources
- Ownership Structure
- Syndication
- Tunisian Companies
- Venture Capital’s Shares Held.
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