



Trends in the Development of Extremism Among Youth in Modern Russian Society: Internal and External Challenges to National Security

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Abstract

Neutralization of the risks of extremism among youth and the integration of at-risk groups of young people in various spheres of public life – a problem that is of particular importance for Russian national security. The successful solution of the problem, while the "fluid" social reality is changing, is only possible if we take into account the recent trends in the development of extremist formations with due regard for network communities, flash mobilization groups. The article is dedicated to the analysis of the trends of youth extremism re-configuration that occur in modern Russian society, and the contradictions of reactive counteraction policy, the principles of which are not always integrated in a new social reality. The authors substantiate the application of the potential of the activity-activist approach, including the tendency to the definition of youth extremism as a volatile social phenomenon with a highly adaptive potential. Based on the results of the research, the authors describe the new internal and external development challenges of extremist groups in Russia: the creation of new topics for manipulating mass consciousness (socio-ecological, social identity-related, culturally-oriented); "dispersion" of extremist structures; inclusion in legal social actions; positioning as open to young people without "preconditions"; inclusion of conventional relations within the framework of the exchange of ideas and "projects". In conclusion, the authors note that recognition of the internal and external challenges of youth extremism requires reformatting its perception and evaluation as a new movement which produces new risks for Russian society.

Keywords: Internal and external challenges; Network groups; New movements; Youth extremism; Virtual reality.

1. Intro

2. duction

The current stage of development of Russian society is characterized by background crisis phenomena relating to social solidarity and social mobilization. Youth extremism, although it covers 6-7% of the active young Russian population, provides a destabilizing effect in strengthening the socio-legal modalities. The actions of young extremists gather a small audience (the average number of 500-600 people), but at the same time they create considerable informational and political concerns, are accompanied by conflicts with the authorities and law enforcement agencies, are associated with the violation of the current legislation and the infringement of the rights and freedoms of citizens.

Youth extremism in modern Russian society is based both on traditional schemes of extremism, which have origins in political and ethno-confessional radicalism, and acquire new contours and outlines related to the emergence of network, "swarm" communities, flash mobilization groups. New topics for manipulating the consciousness of young people (socio-ecological, social identity-related, culturally-oriented) appear in the extremist environment. According to M. K. Gorshkov, Russian society is in a state of a new social reality, which can be characterized by the following words: "despite the severity and level of critical evaluation of the situation in the country, the state of social well-being of Russians

has not gone beyond the typical indicators of the previously observed periods of stabilization and destabilization of the social situation" [1]. In general, the above conclusion is confirmed by the trends of mass consciousness and behavior that do not outrun the "red lines" of the legitimacy of power and the lack of catastrophic consciousness.

However, youth extremism as a behavioral model aimed at the conflict of youth and society, the clash of interests and needs of various social groups under the marker of disorder and discrimination of youth, its readiness for open conflict and violence against the state is manifested not only eventually, but also acquires some regularity on the basis of the growth of extremist sentiments of young people in socially significant and alarming aspects of public life [2].

Therefore, the wave-like nature of youth extremism, the alternation of recessions and booms contains an important problem for Russian society, related to the neutralization of the risks of youth extremism, and the integration of young people in various fields of social life, especially in socio-political one. Undoubtedly, youth extremism is marginalized in the Russian society, but it reveals its influence in the everyday consciousness of young Russians, which is manifested in the conditions of open ethnic and national conflicts, in the attitude to external events, and in the post-crisis syndrome.

In other words, youth extremism is not so interesting relating to preaching radicalism and exclusivity of young people, united with radical parties, but more significant in a point of a strong dangerous tendency to "disperse" extremist structures and their orienta-

tion and to join legal actions of young Russians in order to put them on the level of open conflict with the government and society as internal and external challenges of youth extremism in Russian society.

Noting the mentioned above, it can be stated that youth extremism in Russian society has entered a new phase of organizational and ideological self-determination, is characterized by the absence of internal organizational barriers and shows a sufficient degree of flexibility in the framework of changes in legal, political, cultural and ideological conditions. The phenomenon of youth extremism is based not so much on the socio-age-related, socio-demographic factors, but mostly on the peculiarities of the entry of young people into adulthood and socio-psychological parameters, which should not be forgotten. It is no accident that youth extremism can be qualified as *avant-garde*, as it generates new forms of extremist behavior for society, which are a challenge to the socio-political structure and socio-psychological well-being of society.

It can be said that in the youth extremist environment new strategies of destabilization and projects of authoritarian and totalitarian persuasion are being tested, based on the belief in the need for violence as a socially useful and socially transformative force, intolerance of political opponents and aggression against the state as a guarantor of social order [3]. From the point of view of modern liberal consciousness, youth extremism is generated by the influence of totalitarian sects and totalitarian ideology. However, in reality, this statement is accusatory in nature and cannot pretend to be a social diagnosis of the phenomenon under study.

Youth extremism contains internal and external challenges as a purposeful activity for the destruction and destabilization of the state and society and the expansion of destructive tendencies outside in the context of reducing the level of security and confidence in the globalized world. Thus, youth extremism in the Russian society needs explanation and prognostics related to the identification of the potential of spread and conflict, which allows to increase the effectiveness of the partnership between the state and society in combating and preventing those extremist sentiments and actions of young people which aimed at complication or impossibility of dialogue between society and youth; to clarify mutual expectations as a way of contribution of the social and reproductive role of youth.

3. A Review of the Scientific Literature

Youth extremism has a solid background of sociological research, presented by the founder of sociology of knowledge K. Mannheim, who defined youth extremism as the result of the conversion of social energy of young people in the conditions of unformed dialogue of youth and society, under the influence of reactionary and radical ideas in the system of destructive action [4]. According to mentioned above, youth extremism is estimated at the standpoint of the theory of late modernism, at-risk society, social exclusion of young people, the emergence of a culture of *mojo* and actionism. Foreign researchers analyze youth extremism relating to globalization and domestic political trends, paying special attention to the contradictory impact of globalization on the growth of extremist sentiments (migration, narcotraffic, export of radical ideas, counter-identity movement).

It is important to emphasize that youth extremism is evaluated from the view of transformation into the society of uncertainty, the formation of a new global order, the anxieties of mass consciousness [5]. At the same time, the importance of the subjective factor, which shows the relationship between the emergence and growth of new social movements and transformations of youth extremism is also highlighted. It is concluded that youth extremism adapts to modern conditions, takes new forms, aimed at the introduction of exclusive models of lifestyle and action and the treatment of violence and aggression as an alternative to the basic democratic institutions.

In connection with the aggravation of the situation in the Middle East the interest of scientists to the problems of religious extremism, its links with the ideology of certain political groups, composed of members of a religious extremist communities is constantly growing [6, 7, 8, 9].

In the conditions of globalization and informatization of society, accompanied by minimizing of the control of growing informational flows, the role of the informational factor in the spread of extremist ideas has significantly increased. Regarding to this, a growing number of studies, the subjects of which are the forms and technologies of propaganda of extremism in the information space, especially among the audience of web-pages of extremist communities, forms of counteraction to manipulative information technologies [10, 11, 12, 13, 14].

Russian sociological science focused attention on the problem of youth extremism through studying the phenomenon of Russian informal ("freaky") people in the period of late "perestroika" (rearrangement). The developed concept of youth subcultures emphasized conflicts and split in the youth environment, the manifestation of aggression within the youth environment and towards the state under the influence of the tradition of social anarchism, religious revivalism and totalitarian eclecticism (fascism, nationalism). The cultural sensitive approach represented by the team of V.L. A. Lukov, who summarized the significant results on the classification of informal structures of youth in the study of conflict potential, the spread of extremist ideas among young people on the basis of the use of cultural underground and the conditions of transition to the level of open activity, the struggle for the minds and moods of youth.

In post-soviet studies, youth extremism became the target of structural-functional and structural-activity analysis. Yu. A. Zubok and V. V. Chuprov made a significant contribution to the understanding of the problems of youth extremism, having fixed, firstly, the influence of environmental risks that change the nature of interactions and structures of motives and value orientations of young people, and secondly, the ability to take risk, and thirdly, the reflection of life situations as requiring the use of violence and aggression [15]. Thus, youth extremism was considered in the context of social self-regulation of young people, and the analysis of the given assessments showed that it is necessary to take purposeful actions by the state and public institutions to improve the social and legal competence of young people in order to overcome youth extremism.

The system analysis of Russian youth as a socio-demographic and socio-cultural group was provided in the works of M. K. Gorshkov, F. E. Sherega. Relating to the study of the mentioned movement concerning youth, it is revealed that the source of extremism, which grows into an internal challenge for Russian society, is the state of dissatisfaction and apathy of young people regarding the inclusion in the system of social interaction, in social activity on the basis of legal and legitimate rules. It is emphasized that youth extremism has a resource base in the environment of disappointed and skeptical about the life prospects young people, which is a significant problem of unemployed youth, with feelings of dissatisfaction, anger and alienation from society [16].

As the analysis of the above approaches shows, the internal challenges of youth extremism in the Russian society are associated with a decrease in the civic virtues of young people, their self-regulatory opportunities and are the determinants of negative social mobility of young people. External challenges are determined by the inclusion of Russian youth in global extremist structures that represent powerful channels for the formation of extremist views and beliefs in order to unleash information aggression against national sovereignty, democratic ideals and norms of international law.

The fact that the Islamists have involved in their networks about 2 thousand young Russians who took part in the conflict in the Middle East, and no less significant note that the center of activity of Islamists is shifting to Europe and to the borders of Russia indicate that the analysis of youth extremism is determined by the

designation of dependence and trends operating in the youth environment, where the condition of fear and confusion, and readiness to overcome the crisis conditions by making independence and chaos in the external environment.

Meanwhile, youth extremism in Russian society is in an active simulation process, adapts to legitimate social requirements, exploits the problem of social justice and social prospects of young people. In the group of young extremists-oriented stance of aggression, violence and boycott of the authorities and public institutions promoted the idea of the exclusiveness of the youth, their readiness to storm the bastions of discrimination and humiliation, to create a society of "young" as an alternative to the gerontological and oligarchic elites.

4. Research Methodology

The study of the stated problem involves the use of the potential of the activity-activist approach, including the orientation to the definition of youth extremism as a volatile social phenomenon with a highly adaptive potential in modern society. The choice of research methodology is determined, on the one hand, by the significance of the subjective factor as a motivational determinant, on the other – by the institutional (organizational-structural) parameters of extremist movements in the youth environment, acting on the basis of the network principle together with the scheme of traditional self-organization.

The following issues of governance and self-government of extremist communities, the framework of their interaction with "grown" extremist structures, the alliance policy and confrontation, decentralization and integration of various goals related to the implementation of both excise and mobilization projects are of particular research interest.

The argument in favor of the choice of the research method is the conclusion that youth extremism in the Russian society has undergone changes aiming at the implementation of mini-groups or flash mobilization procedures of actions that have a social and political resonance. It can be said that analogues of "new movements" are effectively used, which requires the researcher to understand the instability of organizational parameters and the complexity of determining the hierarchy of roles in extremist communities. In order to overcome the difficulties of "manipulating" the number of youth extremism is considered in the context of the use of content analysis procedures and in-depth group interviews.

In addition, taking into account the vagueness and volatility of the factors of social and political self-determination of young people, the problem of "triggers" that reinforce the readiness for extremist actions is actualized.

5. Main Results

In the context of the stated topic of the article, it should be emphasized that youth extremism is "liberated" from perception as a growing disease. Indeed, in the socio-political sphere of Russian society, although extremist organizations do not fit in political mainstream, however, they can be considered as focused on the subjectivity of action in order to acquire the status of an independent player, at least in the youth movement.

In the mentioned way, the internal challenges of youth extremism are expressed in the possibility of expanding social targeting, introducing political splits in the youth environment and instigating the youth activism in a constant conflict with the authorities. This could be seen as normal, given that in a democratic society the institution of opposition is a mandatory feature. However, when it comes to youth extremism in Russian society, there is a tendency to pursue undemocratic goals using basic democratic institutions. If we look at the results of sociological research, youth extremism has a narrow basis in society, the large number of extremist groups indicates the fragmentation of the extremist environment.

Although, the network and swarm principles of modern youth extremism are focused on the creation of fluid groups for legal "immunity" and the possibility of switching, mobilization in new areas of application of forces [17]. The fact that compared to the legal youth structures of extremist groups are not burdened with software installations, use the new-fangled eclectic connection of meaning, focused on the use of the youth scheme of invasion of ideas.

The results of sociological research show that youth extremism is focused on the external parameters of "antipathy", the lack of perception of a different point of view, intolerance to the principles of mutual respect and real social distance. Meanwhile, the paradox is that modern youth extremism in Russia is based on a deviation from the rules of tolerance and associated with ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Table 1 shows the cross-tabular comparative figures illustrating the importance to respondents of various social reasons, which is formed and secured inter-ethnic hostility, and social distance (the Rostov region, 2014).

Table 1: Distribution of answers to the question "how much do you think the hostility on the national basis is connected with the following circumstances?" in % to the number of respondents [18]

	Strong connection	Average connection	No connection
With the failure to respect the customs and traditions of the region by people of different nationality	72	19	7
With the labor market competition level	18	39	43
With the life style and behavioral differences	58	25	17

The data allows to conclude that the area of intersection of interests creates the preconditions for the transfer of the conflict of interests on ethnic ground, which give extremists great opportunities for the use of ethnic resources for their own purposes. In this sense, a certain trigger can be considered as a policy of cultivating differences, significantly reducing the interest and understanding of young people to social conflicts and contradictions. It is clear that extremists derive their arguments from the interpretation of ethnic and social problems in the Russian multi-ethnic society as related to ethnic differences.

Hence the most dominant group of extremist can be considered nationalists, promoting imperial, national-state or ethnocentric schemes, focusing on the aiming at ethnic prejudice among young people. It should be noted that in this regard, youth extremism is "wedged" into the system of social inequalities, constructing threats to ethnic identity and ethnic culture. In other words, extremists are aimed at forming ethnic intolerance "forums" among young people through the use of Internet resources.

It seems that by rejecting the rules of external political correctness, extremist groups pretend to express openly the true sentiments and feelings in society, thus evaluating themselves as free from the schemes of manipulation of consciousness by the elites. This opinion can be qualified as a "new religious sectarianism" because it helps to define network and swarm communities not just like-minded groups, but also adepts of new ideas which reproduce intolerance as a safety rule and development feature of society in modern conditions. In other words, the internal challenge of youth extremism in Russian society is embodied in the approval of alternatives to the current norms of political stability and social hostel.

As Russian sociologists have noted, the prospects for protest activity of the non-systemic opposition are linked to reliance on politically active youth [19]. However, it should be clarified that extremist groups are focused on independence, and the paradox of the situation is that the non-systemic opposition relies on the potential of political activity of the part of young people who are in a "sleeping" apathetic state; is able to participate in relevant actions, but does not show interest in political activity as it is. And

it is difficult to agree that between youth and opposition politicians no common language has been found.

The problem is different: youth extremism demonstrates the inclusion of a political new-language, free from traditional ideological schemes. Nationalist groups operate on the basis of presumption of guilt on the basis of ethnic status, therefore they do not need any reasonable grounds. It is not accidentally that we can talk about the "neo-paganism" of youth extremism, attachment to symbols, legends and myths, which go back to the "memory of ancestors". The development of youth extremism gives grounds to believe that it is impossible to exclude the risk of extremists' influence on the state of not only young people, but also other social groups, whose economic and political interests there is no one to protect.

It is the question stated that instead of purposes to reach a consumer lifestyle, wealth and comfort, extremists offer the "disadvantaged" a formula of self-sufficiency on the basis of inclusion in the protest activity as a challenge to the public system. The main target of extremists is a policy of intimidation of the operating elites through the propaganda of the "game without rules", which means a sharp decrease in trust to political and power institutions and transition to the condition of social and political uncertainty in which "from chaos to rebirth", the world in which force and aggression approve the validity of youth waiver.

Based on the results of sociological research, it can be stated that, it is crucial for understanding the prospects of youth extremism, to what extent Russians consider extremist actions normal or acceptable in modern social life. Immigration remains a hot topic, where almost every fifth Russian demonstrates attitude of aggression (21%) (Table 2; 3).

Table 2: Readiness to take part in mass protests, if they take place in the near future at the place of residence of the respondents, the all-Russian sample, % [19]

Causes (mot-tos) of possible mass protests	Readiness to take part in mass protests			
	Unconditionally, yes	More, yes	More, no	Unconditionally, no
To protect residents from influx of migrants	7	14	35	43

Table 3: Distribution of answers to the question: "What impact do migrants have on international relations?", selection in the South of Russia, % [20]

Answers	%
positive	9,1
negative	46,6
none	30,8
difficult to answer	13,5

It should be also taking into account that the supporters of "decisive actions" do not identify themselves as extremists, but the scenarios of violence proposed by extremist structures can be perceived as promising the greatest effect and leading to the consolidation of the "dissatisfied" part of the society. Differences regarding the protection of economic and social rights of citizens are expressed in the fact that the effect of the organization of the crowd does not require the provision of any rational argument [21].

It is noteworthy that extremist structures do not seek to mobilize citizens under socio-economic and socio-political slogans, as they are distanced from "getting involved" in legal forms of political activity. If we compare the current situation with the activity of extremist groups 4-5 years ago, we can see that the focus of attention of extremists has shifted from countering opponents in the youth environment (the phenomenon of Antifa) to confrontation with power structures and supported youth movements. Here, a certain destructive role is played by the lack of implementation of the scenario of "constructive Affairs of youth", the prevention of legitimization of violence, the involvement of "passionaries" from the youth environment in the

formation of an alternative to violence and aggression of youth extremism [22].

With respect of the above, the reconfiguration of youth extremism in order to give a new look to extremist organizations is obvious. Participation in demonstrations, as well as online activity, means that extremist structures position themselves open to young people without "preconditions". The point is that young Russians are offered a "line-up of participation" in extremist actions outside the consolidation of affiliation and hierarchical discipline. As in Russian society 3-10% of the respondents accept violence against representatives of the authorities and the police, beating up political opponents acceptable [19], the extremist discourse does not negate the fact that, with the conclusion that Russia experienced the era of revolutions, the scenario of social rebellion has a high potential risk due to the launch of "spontaneous action" becoming synchronic and coordinated in terms of weakness and discredit of the authorities.

In this regard, the question about the adequate assessment of youth extremism arises: it is ineffective to focus on the description of extremist actions as containing a high destabilizing effect. At the same time, given that Russia has a "rich experience" of extremism and the youth environment is internally conflict, we can assume that the internal challenges of youth extremism operate in the standby mode, associated with the test of the strength of state and public institutions and through the system of law-mobilizing effects in the socio-political, cultural and information spheres "are engaged in the search for gaps and inconsistencies in the functioning of state institutions.

Obviously, extremist sentiments and actions among young people are reproduced in the conditions of not achieving an effective balance between strengthening the power component of the state and making adequate decisions aimed at the emancipation of the social energy of young people [19]. Counteraction to extremist activity among young people is characterized by reactive policy, while extremist structures act situationally, are not focused on the positioning of long-term trends and do not openly declare the coordination of mass actions.

The position of exclusion and exclusivity identified in extremist sentiments is related to the installation of selectivity, counter-elitism, faith in the "delayed mission" of transforming Russian society at the right time and turning "in the right direction". Noting that the extremist groups are competing and often come in strong conflict relations in the youth environment, it is possible to talk about the effect of rallying in front of government institutions.

It should be noted that within the framework of the studied internal challenges of youth extremism, the appeal to the logic of the transformation of extremist activity requires an understanding of how extremist sentiments and behavior form the individual and social behavior of young Russians.

It would be simplistic to believe that the Russian youth is in a stable state of apathy in the political sphere and has a negative attitude towards young over energetic people. The attractiveness of extremism among young people is increasing as the crisis syndrome among young people deepens, which can be converted into the approval of "those" who are at the forefront of the struggle for the interests of young people. It is typical that images of internal and external enemies are constructed in the youth environment, which indicates a lack of social competence and underdevelopment of the ability to understand the social mechanisms of tensions in society.

It is obvious that the internal challenges of youth extremism are determined by the instability and uncertainty of social conditions, when young Russians feel the blurring of the line between legal practices and illegitimate actions. This is reflected in the fact that extremist discourse advocates the idea of youth freedom, based on the expansion of the space of legal and political uncertainty, as evidenced by the evolution in the youth Internet environment [23]. Attempts to regulate and manage this sphere have become the focus of counteraction to youth extremism, as the interventionism of the state means the definition of the boundaries of legal

responsibility. In other words, the internal challenge moves from the sphere of political action to the organization of "resistance to the state" in the Internet environment. The Internet environment has become a space for alternative ways of extremist activity, which is confirmed by the results of the involvement of young people in the network of nationalists and religious extremists. We can say that Russian society is losing to extremists in the struggle for the attitude of young people when it comes to barriers to the promotion of aggression and violence.

Since the government structures are focused on supporting "loyal organizations" and considering that the level of attractiveness of participation in mass official actions is low in the youth environment, prevention of youth extremism requires a change of approaches with a ban on the activities of non-conventional associations in the fight against the movement, which would increase claims to power structures, and stimulation of alternative activities in both real and virtual spaces designed to implement forms of social rationalization of youth, its social creativity, providing opportunities to organize their own business, protect the rights of young people [24].

The internal challenges of youth extremism in Russian society, as noted earlier, are determined by the introduction of the cult of tolerance and exclusion into the youth environment. Practically extremist structures do not put forward socially significant alternatives, speaking from the position of destructive criticism. In this sense, youth extremism can be characterized as a parallel socio-political space with tendencies of total destruction and denial of not only state institutions, but also democratic norms of modern nationhood. Characteristically, there is a fundamental principle of mimicking democracy in the extremist environment and in this scheme, it fits the demand for the abolition of prohibitions and provisions aiming at preventing extremism and similar activities.

It can be noted that in the current situation, the youth extremist structures are not focused exclusively on the legalization of activities, proclaiming the principle of resistance to the government, but using the adjunction by legally operating opposition groups. Here it is important to draw a line between the "game of rules" and the transition to actions related to creating weak state. In other words, the extremist actions use the tactics of a point breakout, increasing political tension in the "zones" that are vulnerable to the state and society.

Indeed, there is a "mixture" of goals and methods of action, leaving behind the traditionally sensitive problems of ethnic relations, subcultures, internal challenges which are being constructed in areas that seem to have no basis for extremist activity. In this sense, the over-population of extremist structures on the problems of social ecology (Khimki forest, garbage scandals in the Moscow region) can be considered as abstract. It can be stated that the problems that have not only domestic, but also foreign resonance are chosen. Thus, internal challenges flow into external ones, as the background of "reaction from abroad" is created within the framework of the implementation of domestic political actions. It can be assumed that extremist structures are aimed at situational and, to a lesser extent, at long-term alliance with foreign extremist organizations.

It should be taken into account that, in comparison with the period of 90th of XX century, it is not about the policy of borrowing and apprenticeship, as it was observed during the period of intensive contacts of Russian young extremists with Neo-Nazi structures in Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain. In the current situation, using the resources of the Internet, media platforms for communication and strategy development in "Facebook", "Telegram", where there is a trend of liberalization of control and exchange of discourses about the assessment of global and domestic situations.

This is confirmed by increased intensity of contacts between left-wing extremist groups among the youth of the Russian society in order to share information and provide financial support to left-wing extremist structures in Europe. It should be taken into

account here that unlike traditional leftists who advocate for freedom of migration, minority rights, tolerance, left extremism in Russian society claims to occupy a niche in the socio-political space, relying in technology on the experience of Western "like-minded", but following the tradition of Russian revolutionary radicalism.

For convergence, the image of the "new people's will executors" has been constructed, and an appeal to the legacy of anarchism and the social revolutionaries. Thus, the schemes of support of the left, which were typical for the last century, are reproduced. It is noteworthy that Russian left-wing extremism among young people is poorly mastering the discourse of a new left turn, is not focused on the restoration of Marxism and is included in the framework of developing its own strategy of action.

Right extremist structures in the youth environment of Russian society are forced to narrow the range of action, as they are unable to speculate on the ideas of statehood and patriotism in the current situation. However, there are signs of reformatting right-wing extremism into migrant-phobia and the idea of the "state for Russians". Here it is necessary to pay attention to the danger of right-wing extremism in imposing on the Russian society the unusual problems of cultural intolerance, interacting with foreign extremist structures young "right" bring to the attitude of Russian youth the idea of "revival" of militant Europe, the essence of which is to protect the cultural and historical identity of Europe and deter the destructive influence of globalization

Characteristically, the Rights master the discourse of anti-americanism as a new anti-globalization trend and at this point claim taking place of the alter-globalists, who sharply reduced activity in the 2000s. It is obvious that the external challenges of youth extremism cannot be separated from the effects of globalization, but it is necessary to distinguish technological influence from ideological. In the first case, there is a risk of increasing the "digital" threat, the conquest of the Internet space as a platform for the introduction of extremist sentiments among young people. This conclusion is confirmed by the activity of extremist groups which created more than 160 forums at the level of "Runet". There is a certain difficulty in the fact that the actions of state structures to prevent youth extremism in the context of the adopted legal regulators can be perceived by society as an attempt to limit freedom on the Internet. But the problem is in the lack of system of interaction between the owners of Internet resources and government agencies in order to determine the criteria of youth extremism that fall under the legal impact. The lack of consensus about the problem is used by extremist structures, when a scheme of perception of the conflict between the authorities and Internet users is constructed in public moods, in reality having the addressee of restrictions on extremist activities in the youth environment.

It should be noted that external challenges have emerged in a new direction, associated with the activation of Islamist structures which use Internet resources, but no less important, aimed at creating groups in the Russian youth environment attack on the "godless" Russian state. It is not only about the idea of the establishing a caliphate in Russia, but also about the inclusion of young Islamists in the new front of the struggle in the Eastern direction (Russia, Central Asia, China) [25]. In this sense, attention should be paid to the warning of the English explorer M. Gilsenan, which marked "the drama of secularism" still in 90th of the twentieth century, re-designing of religious traditions as attempts to inspire the youth to escape from the modern realities of globalization [26].

It is obvious that the new trend of Islamist structures in Russian society becomes an external challenge, because it is about the inclusion of Russia in the "arc of geopolitical instability", the transfer of the conflict of the Middle East repertoire to the Russian soil. The Islamist strategy traces the position of the destruction of traditional Islam and through the youth environment of creating a situation of "overthrow" of the Russian state. Therefore, assessing the external challenges, we can say that, despite the external

dissonance of opinions, the desire of the Neo-Islamists to show rejection of the "secular types" of youth extremism, there is some reason to talk about coordination of actions, that objectively created the distribution of roles and functions in youth extremism. The mentioned is expressed in the fact that extremist structures work for certain groups of young people, observing the principle of inadmissibility of "proselytism" in relation to areas of potential influence. If football fans have become the object of "interest" of right-wing extremist structures in the youth environment, "leftists" are aimed at mobilizing socially deprived layers of youth and try to work "intensively in the student environment, for Islamists is characterized by the statement of youth as a carrier of the values of true Islam and the involvement in the sphere of influence of young Russians by manipulating ethnic and religious factor. There is an attempt to implement the scenario of "neutralization" of resistance to Islamism through the approval of the youth of the idea of rejection of cooperation with the authorities and the inadmissibility of supporting the persecution of supporters of religious extremism, based on the idea of Islamic solidarity, the appeal to the mission of Islam in the modern world, the destruction of the "crusaders". It can be stated that youth extremism in the Russian society overcomes "borders", being involved in globalization processes. This has been processing in a non-linear way by establishing stable contacts or creating national structures: through the Internet space there is an intensive exchange of ideas, technologies and information, which allows you to create launch sites for joint actions as it was observed in the process of recruiting young people to Islamist structures. Here it is necessary to take into account the "lessons of European society", where the bulk of the new converts are migrants in the second and third generations, who have passed the external school of integration into European society [27]. The instructive context is that virtual reality can be attractive for young people, because unlike the institutions of socialization it creates the appearance of voluntary choice and converts the deviated consciousness of young people into a readiness for social aggression and rejection of conventional social norms.

The mentioned topic is relevant for Russian society, in the sense that the area of struggle for the minds and moods of young people is the space of contacts among them, infiltration of extremists into apolitical youth clubs and associations. Noting this fact, we can say that the external challenge of youth extremism in the long term is determined by the involvement of Russian society in the state of ethnic and religious conflict, information on the state of "ghostly" prospects of civil self-organization of young people, the replacement of structures of youth initiative groups of protest action, focused on the fight not only with the state, but also with civil society, which is a difficult way of formation.

Assessing youth extremism in the Russian society, we can say that the situation of uncertainty, decrease of youth confidence in the future is being constructed and due to this state of "young people should take the power in their own hands" is aimed at activating the "social energy" of young people as a destructive factor. Actual warning K. Manheim says that a dynamic society cannot exist without spiritual calling to its aspirations, bearing in mind that the main meaning of countering youth extremism is to provide young people the opportunity to participate in the social renewal movement, to be a conductor of new unifying ideas.

Youth extremism is characterized by the fact that it claims a monopoly of possession of the minds of young people, representing its actions as a policy of renewal of public life and considering the internal and external challenges of youth extremism in the Russian society, it should be said that it is important to "prepare" young people to perform new tasks in the economical field and socio – political sphere of life. If it does not occur, the mobilization of young people can be extremist, paving the way for new social and political conflicts.

Noting that youth extremism in Russian society produces a multiplicative risk-taking effect, that it is not necessary to deceive the periphery of youth extremism in the socio - political spectrum of

Russian society, we can conclude that in the current situation, in the view of increase of political and social uncertainty, fragmentation of global relations associated with the formation of a multipolar world, youth extremism becomes, if not a priority problem of society, but deserving close attention one, due to national security reasons and the consolidation of community facing the new challenges.

6. Conclusion

Public sentiment in Russian society is experiencing huge overloads associated with increased attempts to mislead and disorientate the Russian youth. Strengthening of youth extremism is promoted not only by objective circumstances related to the crisis phenomena of socio-economic life, but also by subjective ones, when state and civil ideals are tested for strength, when the desires of Russian youth are ambiguously affected by the manifestations of bureaucracy, corruption, social indifference and social stratification. As revealed in the research process, internal and external challenges, youth extremism in Russian society needs not only reformation of youth policy, as evidenced by a tendency at official level to make it socially attractive, aimed at unlocking the potential of Amateur and self-organization of youth, but also of the attitude of society to young people as a group for social development, as realization of the hopes and aspirations of the Russian society.

Relating to this, the internal and external challenges of youth extremism certainly present false alternatives, give a sense of hopelessness and futility of the implementation of life strategies. Youth extremism in Russian society, despite its diversity, is united in the position of counteraction and resistance to the efforts of society and the proposal to create a "normal life". As it is clear from the above, there is a trend of reconfiguration of youth extremism, leaving in the virtual space with the adoption of political actions in the reality.

Taking into account that at the present stage youth extremism uses the experience of "new movements" and has moved to the "digital" basis, applies the principle of building network and swarming communities, escaping from the political and legal control of the state and is aimed at connecting to civil initiatives, it becomes urgent to change both perception and action in relation to youth extremism. First of all, it should be understood that in the framework of countering youth extremism through legal measures, it is possible to limit the impact of extremist ideas by applying the current legislation to extremist assets. At the same time, it should be recognized that youth structures associated with political parties are characterized by static, bureaucratic, little initiative for work with the youth environment, in order to deprive the core of youth extremism of support and sympathy in the youth environment, close the channels of recruitment of socially dysfunctional and disoriented youth in extremist structures.

Secondly, it is necessary to realize the long-term nature of counteraction to extremist sentiments and actions in various spheres of public life using non-standard methods of influence on youth subcultures, youth drive, youth creativity. Based on the mentioned above, it is necessary to know and study youth extremism as a constantly changing social reality and to support international cooperation in preventing and combating youth extremism, in order to allow to detect the causes and opportunities of destructive processes which has been invading Russian society.

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